The concept of feedback has long occupied a hallowed place in the literature of applied psychology. Despite some evidence to the contrary (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hammond & Summers, 1972; Steinman, 1976) , both the human performance and organizational behavior/management literature suggest that feedback can exert a positive effect on performance (e.g., Ammons, 1956; Annett, 1969; Carver & Scheier, 1982; Greller, 1980; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979 , Ivancevich & McMahon, 1982 Nadler, 1979) The generally accepted feedback-performance relationship implies that, other things (e.g., task-related experience) being equal, better performing individuals would be more likely to access and use feedback information This is consistent with the notion that "Feedback is central to the learning of expertise" (Hogarth, 1981, p 202) There are, however, reasons for arguing just the opposite, especially in situations that involve complex, cogmtively rich decision making. Providing the rationale for this argument requires a more detailed consideration of the concept of feedback itself.
The cybernetic theorist Wiener (1948 Wiener ( , 1950 ) is usually credited with introducing the concept of feedback to the behavioral sciences and popularizing its use (cf. Nadler, 1979) Although there might be minor disagreement, most would concur with the following description provided by Ilgen et al. (1979, p. 351) : "At its most basic level, feedback is information received by an individual about his or her past behavior (Annett, 1969) . It provides some information about the correctness, accuracy or adequacy of the response (Bourne, 1966) " In addition to the central notion of "information regarding the accuracy of response," Ilgen et al. conjectured that feedback also possesses other characteristics. Specifically, they referred to the "information value" of feedback, which they said depends on "the incremental increase in knowledge about performance that the feedback provides the recipient" (p 351).
The notions of "accuracy of response" and "information value" find parallels m the Social Judgment Theory concepts of "outcome feedback" and "cognitive feedback," respectively (cf. Hammond, McClelland, & Mumpower, 1980, p. 228) . Whereas outcome feedback is information that describes the accuracy or correctness of the response, cognitive feedback represents information regarding the how and why that underlies this accuracy Diagnostic or "cognitive feedback" may also be considered in terms of the concepts of predictive and explanatory value. Predictive value refers to the correlation between accurate information regarding one's past performance and the ability of this information to predict future levels of performance. In contrast, explanatory value represents information regarding why certain relationships occurred. This may or may not be accompanied by an ability to predict if (or when) these relationships will occur in the future, that is, predictive and explanatory value are conceptually independent. By way of example, a parent might be able to answer a child's question as to why an eclipse of the sun has occurred but not be able to predict when it will occur again (i.e., explanatory value). In contrast, the same parent might be able to demonstrate to his auto mechanic the existence of a predicted relationship between stepping on the gas pedal and hearing a strange rattle yet be unable to explain why this has occurred (i.e., predictive value). Hammond and Summers (1972) , Hammond, Summers, and Deane (1973) and Steinman (1976) found that when predictive value is low, providing feedback after each trial can be both misleading and detrimental to learning a functional relationship. This suggests that, given a situation involving experienced decision makers who have access to task environment feedback that is neither predictive nor explanatory, the better performing decision makers are more likely to be the ones who have learned to disregard this feedback. More specifically, a principal objective of the present investigation is to test the hypothesis that task environment feedback providing completely accurate response information (i.e., outcome feedback) but containing neither predictive nor explanatory (i.e., cognitive or information) value is less likely to be used by better as compared to poorer performing decision-makers Real-world decision makers operating in a task environment that was both cognitively complex and dynamic were considered best for testing the hypothesis. This is because it is further anticipated (though not tested by the present investigation) that the hypothesized relationship is more likely to be manifested with task environments that are relatively complex (i.e., ones in which the task environment is rich in information) rather than simple, and are dynamic (i.e., actively changing independent of the actions of the decision maker) rather than static. The securities market and security analyst decision making seem to satisfy these criteria. As Slovic (1969, p. 79) comments: Security analysis, whether by expert or novice, might be labeled "the information game" In no other realm are such vast quantities of information from such diverse sources brought to bear on so many important decisions Careful accumulation and skilled interpretation of this information is said to be the sine qua non of accurate evaluation of securities For this reason, security analyst decision making has been found quite useful for testing various psychological propositions (e.g., Clarkson, 1962; Ebert & Kruse, 1978; Kozminsky, Kintsch, & Bourne, 1981; Slovic, 1969 Slovic, , 1972 Slovic, Fleissner, & Bauman, 1972) .
The types of information believed to have an impact on stock prices are generally classified into one of three categories: market factors, industry-specific factors, and companyunique factors. Market factors refer to the general economic and political background and include such world and national events as wars, changes in governments, monetary policy, or short-term interest rates. Industry-specific factors refer to trends and developments affecting an industry as a whole (e.g., the impact of Japanese exports on the U.S electronics and computer industry; deregulation of the airline and trucking industries, etc ), as well as the activities of the various competing firms within that industry. Company-unique factors may be broken into two categories: those involving consideration of a specific company's financial statement (often referred to as "fundamental analysis") and those involving nonfinancial matters, such as the quality of its management or whether its labor force is about to negotiate a new contract.
There seems to be increasing agreement that "market factors have very little to do with investment performance" (Hagaman & Jensen, 1977, p 64) . According to King (1966) and Blume (1971) , general market factors explain only about 30% of the total variation in the price of a particular company's stock. Further, industry-specific factors seem to explain perhaps another 12% of this variance (King, 1966) . "The implication of these findings is that 50% of the variance in stock prices is due to factors unique to the specific firm" (Tersine &Celec, 1976, p. 32) . Accordingly, it becomes important to learn just which types of company-unique factors are most useful, since analysis of these fundamental factors seems to represent the key to rational investment decisions Regarding the two categories of company-unique factors, Bernstein (1975) comments: Even assuming that psychological and other (I e , market and industry-specific) factors do account for as much as 50% of price changes, those who abandon fundamental analysis on the basis of such an argument abandon control over the other 50% of their investment decisions In fact, they surrender much more because the fundamental factors affecting a business entity lend themselves to a much more detailed, disciplined and systematic analysis than do some of the extreme factors affecting the price-earnings ratio Thus fundamental analysis is a necessary ingredient of a rational and prudent investment decision (p 60) Based on the above review, fundamental factors can thus be assumed to account for at least 30% to 35% of the variance in security analyst decision making (see Figure 1) . Accordingly, this study used actual fundamental factor information for New York Stock Exchange stocks to test the hypothesis that completely accurate outcome feedback from the task environment that contains neither predictive nor explanatory value is less likely to be used by better as compared to poorer performing security analysts.
Method

Sample
Subjects were recruited through mailed invitations to professional security analysts working for different investment firms in the Wall Street area These letters indicated that research was being undertaken on security analyst decision making and that this research would take the form of a competition The core of the letter reads as follows
The purpose of this letter is to invite you to participate in this competition The winner will receive a $500 prize and a press release identifying the winner will be distributed to the appropriate media Briefly, each competitor will be confronted with the same set of eight common stocks, representing eight consumer oriented firms listed in the NYSE, and be given access to 26 different types of fundamental factors regarding each of these stocks The task will be to identify 30% CA. Figure 1 Elements incorporated into security analyst decision making the "best buy" from among the set of eight stocks, not once, but for each of four different time periods spaced 90 days apart . The analyst whose four decisions produce the highest cumulative percentage growth over the four test periods will be declared the winner The $500 prize and promised press coverage were both used to instill a degree of realistic motivation The industry is accustomed to providing recognition in the form of annually published and widely disseminated lists of top performing analysts Furthermore, the $500 prize meant that there was something of consequence riding on the decision Hence, each participant could be expected to treat the task seriously, thereby satisfying the "consequentiahty" desideratum (cf Jams & Mann, 1977, p 69) More than twice as many analysts returned response forms volunteering to participate as the number that actually participated The invitation letters were mailed near the end of an extended period of sluggish market activity (July, 1982) By the time most were phoned to schedule a test interview, the market experienced a dramatic resurgence in activity and many analysts who had earlier replied that they would participate then chose to decline Second, because analysts had to be tested individually, scheduling problems made it inconvenient for others who had expressed a willingness to participate to actually do so Third, the study was computer-administered and several computer malfunctions, both between subjects and during the time a subject was actually participating, created further decreases in sample size Notwithstanding these problems, the obtained sample of 17 is still considerably larger than that employed by either Clarkson (1962) , Slovic (1969), or Ebert and Kruse (1978) and is only one less than that employed by Slovic et al (1972) The sample consisted of 3 women and 14 men Seven were between 21 and 30 years old, another 7 were between 31 and 40, and 3 were over 40 Their careers as professional security analysts ranged from 1 5 to 17 years (M =69 years, SD = 5 7), and the amount of time spent working with their present employer ranged from (L months to 6 years (M = 2 3 years, SD = 1 8) Fifteen of the analysts had master's degrees (14 M B A s and IMS), two held bachelor's degrees Two analysts declined to respond to an item regarding the income they derived from their activities as professional security analysts Another 8 indicated that their income was below $75,000 a year, 7 indicated that their income was above this amount
Test Setting
Testing took place in a specially equipped test facility at NYU's Graduate School of Business Administration, immediately adjacent to the American Stock Exchange, a site conveniently situated for most firms in the Wall Street area
Task and Instructions
Each analyst participated in a behavioral process (BP) simulation A general overview of the BP approach was provided in Jacoby, Chestnut, Weigl, and Fisher (1976) More recent papers (e g, Chestnut & Jacoby, 1982 , Jacoby, 1977 , Jacoby, Chestnut, Hoyer, Sheluga, & Donahue, 1978 , Major, 1980 , Sheluga, Jaccard, & Jacoby, 1979 will guide the reader to more than 20 investigations that have employed this approach
The analysts were tested individually Upon arriving at the test facility, analysts were asked to read the following brief descriptions of the simulation and the rules for the competition The purpose of this task is to examine how professional security analysts make decisions as to which common stocks represent a good purchase
In a short while, you will be asked to decide which one of eight stocks represents the "best buy" For purposes of this study, the best buy is denned as that stock most likely to show the greatest percentage of growth in price per share over the next 90 day period
The eight stocks represent major U.S retailing firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange during the years [1969] [1970] This time frame coincides with the first term of the Nixon presidency, the Vietnam conflict, and was generally a period characterized by economic expansion and growth So that your knowledge regarding the present condition of these firms does not influence your decision-making, we have given them fictitious names However, all the information to which you will have access is authentic and is the actual information that was available for these stocks during the 1969-1970 period You will be able to acquire information on any of 26 different fundamental factors for each stock A list of these factors is provided at the back page of these instructions While we recognize that professional analysts often integrate yet other kinds of information into their decision making, for purposes of this task, you are asked to arrive at a decision based only on the 26 fundamental factors that are available Thus, you will have access to 208 different items of information-that is, 26 items of information for each of 8 stocks (=208 total items of information) All this information is stored in the computer Since it would be unreasonable to expect you to keep all the information in your head while you're arriving at your decision, a set of recording sheets has been provided so that, if you wish, you can make notes You will actually be making four different "best buy" decisions The first will be for October 1969 Once you have made this decision, the computer will update the available information by three months (so that they reflect the data existing as of January 1970), and you will be asked to arrive at a second "best buy" decision regarding these same eight stocks After you have reached this second decision, the information will again be updated by three months to reflect April 1970 data This cycle is repeated for a total of four periods In all, you will be asked to make four "best buy" decisions regarding the same set of 8 stocks, beginning with October 1969 and ending with July 1970
Throughout, there are five basic rules you need to bear in mind as you go about obtaining information from the computer These are 1 You may obtain information only for the 3-month period provided That is, you will not be able to go backward to access information from an earlier period, or forward to access information for a future date 2 Within each period, you are free to examine up to 104 of the 208 items of information available There is no "correct" or "right" amount of information to look at You may choose to look at 2 items, 20 items, or 100 items, It's all up to you 3 You may examine the available information in any order you want 4 You may examine an item of information more than once That is, you may return to look at information you have seen before Simply instruct the computer to display that item again 5. You are free to make as many or as few notes on the recording sheets as you like So that you can become familiar with how to operate the computer, we will begin with a short practice task involving three stocks taken from the airline industry Although it was estimated that each session would require I'h to 2'h hours, no time limit was imposed The amount of time actually used ranged from V/i to 6V2 hours The 104-item limit noted in the second rule was necessitated by the storage limitations of the computer, as described below
Information Environment
For each test period, the information environment confronting the analyst consisted of 208 separate items of information-26 fundamental factors for each of eight companies To eliminate the possibility of extraneous confounds, all the stocks were drawn from the same industry To reduce the possibility that the respondents' memories would exert an effect on their information accessing, the data were taken from the period spanning October 1969 through July 1970 The only information that was not authentic was the names of the firms; the letters J, K, L, M, N, Q, R, and S were used instead of firm names The names of the firms actually involved were Lane Bryant, Gimbels, Hughes and Hatcher, R H Macy, J C Penney, Sears, Roebuck and Co, F W Woolworth, and Zayres
The fundamental factor information regarding each of these companies was taken from the "Monthly Stock Digest," which was published by Data Digests (1969 Digests ( -1970 and mailed monthly by Merrill Lynch to its clients This information was taken from the October 1969, January 1970, April 1970, and July 1970 issues It should be noted that test Periods 1, 2, and 4 reflected a relatively stable to "bullish" market, whereas Period 3 reflected a "bearish" market, that is, all eight stocks decreased in value during this period The 26 fundamental factors that were used were selected after both a review of the literature and consultation with knowledgeable colleagues revealed that these 26 factors were rather comprehensive in terms of covering factors typically considered by security analysts (see Figure 1 ) Note, also, that one of the factors,"% price change over the past three months," was a precise statement of the performance criterion, that is, the analysts were instructed to select "that stock most likely to show the greatest percentage of growth in price per share over the next 90 day period "
All information was stored in a Cromemco Z-2H microcomputer This enabled the order of presentation of both the stock and the fundamental factors to be randomized across respondents, that is, though each respondent received the same eight stocks and 26 fundamental factors, these were presented in different orders for each respondent To avoid confusing the respondents, the order remained constant for each respondent across the four separate test periods for that respondent
Procedure
Respondents commenced reaching their "best buy" decision for Period I by communicating with the computer via a light pen attached to a color video monitor After an initial series of person-machine interactions to review the task instructions and rules, two "menu" lists were displayed-one containing the names of eight stocks, and the other being a list of 26 fundamental factors-and the analyst was asked to indicate which type of fundamental factor information he or she wanted to see for which security The analyst was permitted to access only a single item of information at a time, for example, "price/earnings" information for Company J Accessing of this information was accomplished by touching the screen twice with the light pen-once to identify the stock for which the information was being requested and a second time to identify the fundamental factor-and the desired information appeared on the screen almost instantaneously.
After acquiring this first item of information, the computer inquired whether the analyst wanted to make a best buy recommendation at that point or wanted to acquire additional information If the analyst replied that he or she wanted to acquire information, the two lists were displayed again, and the analyst used the light pen to indicate which item of information he or she next wished to consider Each analyst continued in this way until the point at which he or she felt ready to make a "best buy" recommendation This, too, was indicated via the light pen After the analyst arrived at a "best buy" decision for Period 1. the information for the eight securities was automatically updated by three months and the analyst proceeded m a similar manner to arrive at "best buy" decisions for Periods 2, 3, and 4 As a result of having worked through the brief practice task, which served as a warm-up exercise, none of the analysts evidenced any difficulty with this procedure Following completion of all four periods, the analyst completed a brief questionnaire, which inquired about the task, collected certain demographic and employment information, and included the following manipulation check as the very first question "Did you think you knew the identity of any of the stocks''" In all there were (8 stocks X 17 analysts) 136 opportunities for the analysts to correctly guess the identities of the test stocks Only one of the analysts responded "yes," and was directed to answer the following question "If yes, please indicate the name of the firms that you think were involved by writing the names of these firms next to the corresponding letter" This analyst wrote in the name of only one firm, which was correct This manipulation check thus revealed that the tactic of using letters to camouflage the identities of the stocks worked as intended
Results
The procedures described above generate voluminous quantities of data, much of which is relevant for answering other questions. A detailed report of much of these data is being provided elsewhere (Jacoby, Kuss, Troutman, & Mazursky, 1984) . Except for providing a suitable context by briefly summarizing some of the findings bearing on the depth of search, The present report focuses exclusively on the data relating to feedback.
Background
Overall depth of search Table 1 summarizes the descriptive data regarding the amount of information acquired and provides perspective across all four test periods. Several findings are noteworthy. First, on average and across all four periods, analysts accessed 42.6 items of information per test period. (This mean decreases to 41.1 when accessing of a previously accessed information is excluded.) In other words, the analysts accessed less than 20% of all the available information.
Second, m most cases the respondents considered information for each of the eight stocks at least once. However, on average, they considered fewer than 8 of the 26 fundamental factors that were available {M = 7.9; Mdn = 7.5). This latter finding compares quite favorably to those reported by Slovic (1969) .
Third, dividing the mean number of stocks considered (7.9) into the mean number of items considered (411) indicated that, on average, the analysts paid attention to only five items of information for each of the stocks that they considered.
Fourth, the 26 X 8 information environment represents an investigator-oriented perspective on depth of search. However, not all the available information is necessarily useful, worthwhile, or even meaningful to all respondents Hence, it is also insightful to adopt a respondent-oriented perspective and ask: If attention were limited to only those stocks and factors considered by the analyst at least once, then what percentage of the information from that submatrix was accessed? Using this perspective, search seems to have been relatively extensive. On average, 66% of each analyst's own submatnx was accessed, indicating a tendency for the analyst to compare each of the stocks along a subset of similar factors.
Comparing depth of search across test periods The breakdown for periods shows relatively extensive search in the first period (mean number of items accessed = 62.5), followed by a sharp and substantial decline for the next three periods (means = 35.6, 34.5, and 38.1, respectively). This trend may be explained as follows.
Several of the fundamental factors represented annual information that did not change throughout the four test periods (or at least, for two successive periods). Thus, once accessed, several analysts tended not to reaccess this information in subsequent periods. Moreover, although Periods 1, 2, and 4 reflected either a steady or increasing market, the third period represented a sharp decline in stock prices. Consequently, analysts may have engaged in more extensive information acquisition in the fourth period as a result of obtaining negative feedback on their preceding (third period) performance.
The general trend (of a sharp decline in depth of search after the first period) is also consistent with traditional learning theory. Although it could be assumed that the participating analysts were unfamiliar with all the stocks during the first period, their increased familiarity resulted in more efficient decision processes in subsequent periods. The slight deviation during the fourth period can be explained by sharp decline in stock prices at the end of the third period
Operationahzing Performance
The performance criterion used to distinguish between the better and poorer analysts was based directly on the increases in price per share of each security, calculated separately for each of the four test periods The analyst whose four choices produced the greatest net yield was declared the winner. The yields that were actually possible ranged from +33.1% to -76.3%.
Several interesting findings emerge from a consideration of this performance index. First, had they invested money in a real-world situation as they recommended in the task, only two of the analysts would have managed to make money over the 12-month period; the other 15 would have lost money-seven of them would have lost 40% to 55% of the original value of their stocks. Much of this loss was experienced during Period 3, which was characterized by a sharp market decline. In all fairness to the participants, analysts operating in a real-world environment are able to more closely monitor the day-to-day performance of their stocks and would not wait up to 3 months to divest themselves of a sinking security. If calculation of the performance index is based only on Periods 1, 2, and 4, then the numbers are reversed, with 15 out of Second, performance was not related to several key characteristics Across the entire sample of 17 analysts, performance correlated negatively and nonsigmficantly with age (r = -.22; p = .40) and tenure with present employer (r = -.37; p= .14) and correlated negligibly with either tenure as an analyst (r = .03; p = .92) or income (r = .04; p = .89).
Suggested by one anonymous reviewer, additional perspective on performance is provided by comparing the actual performance of the analysts against a random choice strategy where the probability of picking the winning stock in each period is p = 1/8. Therefore, for each analyst, the probability of getting r successes in four trials can be computed using the binomial expansion. As can be seen from Table 2 , though the obtained distribution reflected slightly better than chance performance, this difference was not significant (chisquare = 5.03; ns).
Operationahzing Feedback
Several important points need to be made regarding the manner in which feedback was operationalized. First, feedback information was made available as part of the external information environment. More specifically, it was one of the 26 fundamental factors (namely, "perceived price change over the last three months") that could be accessed by the analysts.
Second, making feedback information available is qualitatively different from insuring that feedback information is actually provided to the decision maker. Although the real world reflects both types of situations, virtually all prior research has involved providing information to the decision maker-either after the response has been made or, in some instances, before the decision maker even begins to interact with the task environment (see the discussion of "feed forward" in Hammond et al., 1980, p. 229 ) Some might contend that simply making information available does not constitute feedback. Others, however, could contend that providing feedback information also fails to satisfy the classic definition. For example, Nadler (1979, p. 310) , in evaluating Wiener's (1950, p. 35) classic definition, observed: "Thus, feedback is information about the actual performance or actions of a system used to control the future actions of a system" (italics added). In other words, unless said information is then used to control future actions, simply providing feedback information is insufficient for defining feedback in the classic sense. For present purposes, we rely on a looser definition and justify this by observing that many real-world situations may be characterized as ones that simply contain feedback information as part of the external environment. However, as is discussed below, the distinction between "information availability" and "information provision" has substantial implications for conceptualizing and modeling the feedback process Third, as is required for testing the hypothesis, the feedback information was completely accurate m regard to the correctness of the response. By accessing this information, the decision maker could tell exactly how well each security had performed and, in turn, how well he or she had performed Fourth, also as is required for testing the hypothesis, the feedback information was not explanatory; it provided no information as to why the obtained outcome actually occurred.
Finally, the feedback information also failed to be predictive. That is, had a decision maker employed the simple choice heuristic of accessing only feedback information and then based a decision on just this information, the net performance index (based on predicting performance from Period 1 to Period 2, from Period 2 to Period 3, and from Period 3 to Period 4) would have been -41.7%. This would have tied such an hypothetical analyst with the 15th ranked analyst in our investigation. As Casey (1979, p. 91) pointed out: "It is an axiom in security analysis that past performance is not a guarantee of future performance." Table 3 provides a detailed breakdown, for each analyst and each security, of whether and, if so, just when feedback information was accessed during each of the periods (2, 3 and 4) for which feedback is relevant. This table is explained as follows. The 17 analysts are arranged in order of their net performance across all four test periods, from the best performing analyst on the left to the worst performing analyst on the right. The block of rows under the label "Period 2" refers to the information that the analysts accessed during Period 2 while in the process of arriving at their stock selection decisions. How each security (labeled from J to S) actually performed during the previous 90-day period is indicated under the heading "Feedback." The row labeled "Total" indicates the total number of items of information acquired by each of the analysts during that period. Blank cells indicate that no feedback information was accessed by that analyst during that period for that security. The numbers in cells that contain a number indicates the order in which that item of feedback information was accessed. For example, the fourth-bestperforming security analyst accessed a total of 56 items of information before making his choice during Period 2. He did not access any feedback information until doing so for Stock N on the 17th item. He then went on to consider feedback information for stocks Q, K, S, R, M, J, and L, in that order. From the 25th through 56th item in his search, he looked at other types of fundamental factor information. Note that the mne cells containing multiple entries (e.g., the fifth-best-performing analyst for stock S during Period 4) indicate that the analyst accessed that particular feedback information more than once. 
Performance and the Accessing of Feedback Information
Inspection of
24
" Denotes the stock selected by the analyst as the "best buy" for that period performing analysts (Numbers 1 and 17) , did not consider any feedback information whatsoever. Second, those that did access feedback did not do so consistently. More specifically, although five of the analysts accessed all the available feedback information for all eight stocks across all three periods, the remaining seven analysts accessed some feedback for some of the securities some of the time but not for other securities at other times. In terms of the hypothesis, the patterns seem clear. Given three periods and eight securities, each analyst could have acquired up to 24 different items of feedback. Yet, of the seven best performing analysts, four accessed no feedback information whatsoever and only one accessed all the available feedback information In contrast, of the seven worst performing security analysts, only one accessed no feedback information at all and two accessed all the available feedback information.
Moreover, within a period, when one of the top seven performing analysts accessed feedback for one security, he or she did so for all eight securities. In contrast, on five different occasions (out of 7 analysts X 3 periods = 21 such occasions), when one of the seven poorest performing analysts accessed feedback information for a security, he or she apparently did not feel compelled to access feedback information for all the other securities. This tendency for better performing decision makers to engage m more systematic accessing is likely not limited to the accessing of feedback information but probably reflects a tendency toward predecision information accessing in general (cf. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kozminskyetal., 198 l; Sternberg& Powell, 1983) .
In all, the seven top performing analysts accessed 48 items of feedback information out of a possible (3 periods X 7 analysts X 8 securities =) 168 such items, or 28.6%. In contrast, the seven poorest analysts accessed a total of 115 items of feedback information, or 68.5%. Applying Ferguson's (1966, pp. 204-206) test for the significance of the difference between uncorrelated proportions yielded a chi-square of 117 (p < 0.0001). However, the fact that the middle three analysts accessed all the available feedback information suggests that a more appropriate test would be a correlation, based on the entire sample, between the proportion (from 0 to 24) of feedback information accessed and the performance criterion. Across all 17 analysts, the correlation between the proportion of outcome-only feedback accessed and decision quality is -.48 (p = .02). Based on these findings, the hypothesis that task environment feedback that provides only accurate outcome feedback but that contains neither predictive nor explanatory value (i.e., cognitive feedback) will be less used by better peformmg decision makers is considered confirmed.
Additional perspective is provided by Table  4 , which considers the order in which feedback information was accessed on a secunty-by-secunty basis. The two numbers appearing under each analyst should be read as follows. The second number indicates the total number of information items accessed by that analyst for that security during that period; the first number indicates the order in which feedback information was first accessed from among all the information accessed for that security during that period. For example, the fourth best performing analyst accessed a total of seven items for information regarding stock J during Period 2, with feedback information being accessed third out of these seven items.
Because different analysts engaged m different amounts of search, the following procedure was employed to enable aggregation and comparisons to be made across analysts, securities, and periods. For each analyst who considered feedback information, the order in which that information was accessed relative to the other items of information accessed for that security was converted to a 100-pomt scale, where 1 indicated highest priority and 100 indicated lowest priority. This was accomplished by dividing the rank order by the total number of items accessed. To illustrate, take the example noted above m which the fourth best performing analyst accessed seven items of information for stock J during Period 2, with feedback information being accessed third out of this set. One seventh is equivalent to .14 and three sevenths equals .42; this is therefore the "accessing priority score" assigned to the fourth analyst on Period 2 for Stock J. Had the analyst accessed 12 items of information for that security, with feedback being the ninth fundamental factor considered, the accessing priority score would have been .75. * To be read as number of factors accessed by a given analyst in both Periods 1 and 2, summed across all five analysts b To be read as number of factors accessed by a given analyst in Period 1, but not Period 2, summed across all five analysts c To be read as number of factors not accessed by a given analyst in Period 1 which were accessed in Period 2, summed across all five analysts " Cell entries are to be read as follows The five best performing analysts accessed information on a combined total of 59 factors in Periods 1 and 2. Of these, 27 factors that had been accessed in Period 1 were also accessed in period 2, 17 factors that had been accessed m Period 1 were not reaccessed in Period 2, and 15 factors not accessed in Period 1 were accessed in Period 2
The right-hand column of Table 4 contains the aggregated accessing priority scores for feedback information for Periods 2, 3, and 4. To test whether the trend of increased priority given to accessing feedback over the periods was statistically significant, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was employed. The test yielded an F ratio of 31.8 (p = .0001), indicating a significant change in the accessing priority given to feedback information across the three periods. A Scheffe test was then applied to determine whether the stages of accessing information feedback differed between adjacent periods. The results show that the priority that security analysts assigned to feedback information in the second period was significantly lower than the priority that they assigned to feedback in the third and fourth periods (p = .05). However, despite the fact that the fourth period reflects earlier accessing of feedback information, the difference between the third and fourth periods is not significant.
Learning From Experience
A related set of questions concerns information accessing of the other 25 fundamental factors across the four periods, particularly as this relates to learning from experience (Einhorn, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981) . Given that the analysts focused on only a limited number of the available factors (see Table 1 ), one might expect that, as the number of periods increased, there would be greater convergence or overlap in the factors considered from one period to the next, and decreased attention to factors not considered during the previous period.
To examine this question, the data for the five best and five worst performing analysts were sorted into three categories (see Table 5 ). The first category included all instances in which at least one item of information was accessed on the same factor in two successive periods. The second category included all cases in which information accessed on a given factor m one period was not reaccessed on that factor in the subsequent period. The third category included all instances in which a factor that was not considered in one period was accessed in the immediately succeeding period.
A one-way ANOVA applied to these data revealed that, though present, neither the trend toward increasing convergence (27, 35, 37) nor the trend of decreasing attention paid to different factors (15, 11, 5) was significant for the five better performing analysts. However, for the five poorer performing analysts, although the degree of overlap remained roughly the same across periods, there was a significant, F(2, 13) = 5.3, p = .03, increase in the attention paid to new factors (3, 8, 14) . These data suggest that the better performing analysts might have been more effective learners. Alternatively, these data may also be interpreted as indicating that the poorer performing analysts were also learning-as evidenced by the fact that, m view of then-poor performance, they continued looking at other factors.
Discussion
Two basic findings are suggested by this investigation. First, given an environment that permits decision makers to be selective in choosing the information that they will and will not consider, not everyone chooses to access feedback information-at least not when such information possesses only "outcome value" and fails to also possess either predictive and/or explanatory value. Second, as predicted, better performing decision makers are the ones who are less likely to access such "outcome only" feedback information than are poorer performing decision makers.
These findings need to be considered in terms of several limitations. First, the sample consisted of 17 volunteer analysts. Much greater confidence would be obtained from a larger and more representative sample.
More importantly, the present investigation was also limited by the fact that respondents were able to access feedback information on only three occasions (that is, during Periods 2, 3, and 4). This was due to the amount of time required for the task. As previously noted, the analysts devoted an average of 2'/2 hours to the task, and one analyst actually spent more than 6 hours. Real-world security analysts, as well as other types of decision makers, generally have access to much greater numbers of feedback occasions. Future research would do well to examine the impact of a greater number of feedback trials.
Third, the task that was employed did not faithfully model real-world security analyst decision making in at least two key respects. First, though it required that the analyst make a "buy" decision, it did not also permit a "sell" response; second, it did not adopt a "portfolio" approach, that is, the buying and selling of two or more securities at one time. Note, however, that this limitation did not detract from our ability to test the hypothesized relationship.
It should also be noted that the present investigation provided what might be termed "absolute" rather than "relative" feedback. That is, the feedback that was available indicated to the respondents how well they had performed in selecting the best out of the eight available stocks. It did not, however, provide any indication as to how well they did relative to the others with whom they were competing. Yet as Hogarth (1981, p. 210) pointed out: "An important ecological dimension missing from most research on judgment and choice is that decisions are often made in competitive and other social situations.... In competitive situations optimal responses are not necessary for survival. Instead, responses only have to be better than those of competitors . . . (Einhorn, 1980; Hammond, 1972) ." Though the real-world security analyst's task environment does not reflect direct access to relative feedback, it is clear that future research needs to be devoted to this issue.
This study also has other implications. First, both in terms of developing theory and conducting research, it seems obvious that additional consideration needs to be devoted to the diagnostic (that is predictive and explanatory) nature of feedback information. To the extent possible, prior research needs to be reviewed to determine the type of feedback that had actually been provided to the respondent. It may be that outcome feedback has little utility for cognitive (as opposed to motor) tasks and that only predictive and/or explanatory feedback would be useful. Hence, the general feedback-performance relationship would have to be qualified.
Second, it is also clear that theorists need to revise the generally accepted view that the impact of feedback on performance is virtually always positive. Sufficient evidence is beginning to accumulate (Emhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Hammond & Summers, 1972; Steinman, 1976 ; this study) to indicate that it depends on the type of feedback that is involved. In particular, outcome feedback may be particularly disfunctional in a complex, dynamic environment Another implication is that models of feedback that implicitly assume that the decision maker will be given feedback information need to be revised in order to accommodate the active search for and accessing of feedback. When the source of feedback is the task environment itself, especially a complex task environment, the individual must actively engage in the search for and accessing of this information. Without such prior accessing, the individual never will have the opportunity to "perceive" (qua receive and interpret, cf. Ilgen et al., 1979) this feedback.
Finally, most theories of human judgment and decision making actually fail to study feedback (cf. Hammond et al., 1980, p. 228) . As but one example, after acknowledging that feedback/learning constituted one of three key subprocesses of decision making, Payne's (1982, p. 386) integrative review continued. "The feedback/learning processes, though assumed to interact with information acquisition and evaluation, will not be stressed "
Yet the notion of feedback is not only central to our understanding of such phenomena as information evaluation, learning, and decision making, but to our understanding of all of human behavior. Consider the following:
The human information processing system that has evolved to cope with the environment is characterized by essentially sequential processing, limited memory, selective perception, and reliance on cognitive simplification mechanisms (I e, heuristics) Central to these means is the role played by feedback (Hogarth, 1981, p 199) All behavior involves strong feedback effects, whether one is considering spinal reflexes or self-actualization Feedback is such an all-pervasive and fundamental aspect of behavior that it is as invisible as the air we breathe Quite literally it is behavior-we know nothing of our own behavior but the feedback effects of our own outputs (Powers, 1973, p 351) Given the apparently pivotal role of feedback in all human behavior, greater conceptual and empirical attention to this phenomenon than has heretofore been the case appears warranted.
